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Abstract—We investigate the secure communications over cor-
related wiretap Rayleigh fading channels assuming the full chan-
nel state information (CSI) available. Based on the information
theoretic formulation, we derive closed-form expressions for the
average secrecy capacity and the outage probability. Simulation
results confirm our analytical expressions.
Index Terms—Information-theoretic security, wiretap channel,
secrecy capacity, correlated Rayleigh fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because wireless communications are susceptible to eaves-
dropping, traditional security mechanisms mainly rely on cryp-
tographic protocols. Recently, potential benefits of deriving
secure information from physical layer have been reported
in [1]. In [2], the information-theoretic secrecy capacity was
introduced by using the physical properties of channels.
The basic principle of information-theoretic security has
been widely accepted as the strictest notion of security, which
guarantees that the sent massages can not be decoded by a
malicious eavesdropper [1]. Wyner introduced wiretap channel
model to evaluate secure transmissions at the physical layer
[2], where Alice transmits confidential data to Bob and Eve
eavesdrops the data. Csiszar et. al. and Leung-Yan-Cheong
et. al. generalized it to broadcast channels and basic Gaussian
channels, respectively in [3] and [4]. Wei Kang et. al. stud-
ied secure communications over two-user semi-deterministic
broadcast channels [5]. The secrecy capacity is defined as the
difference between the main channel capacity (Alice to Bob)
and the eavesdropping’s channel capacity (Alice to Eve) [4].
Barros et. al. and Gopala et. al. generalized this Gaussian
wiretap channel model to wireless quasi-static fading channels
[6]-[8]. The secure MIMO systems are studied in [9]-[10].
Motivated by emerging wireless applications, there is a grow-
ing interest in exploiting the benefits of relay and cooperative
strategies in order to guarantee secure transmissions [11]-[13].
In this paper, we consider the secure communications within
Wyner’s correlated wiretap channel by building on the detailed
technique in [7]. Similar work studied in [14] gives the limiting
value of the average secrecy capacity, which only converges
into the secrecy capacity at the high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). We derive the closed-form expressions of the average
secure communication capacity and the outage probability un-
der the assumption of the full channel state information (CSI)
available. Simulation results verify our analytical expressions.
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Fig. 1. Fading wiretap channel model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 shows a fading wiretap channel model considered
in this paper. Here, the source Alice transmits confidential
information to the destination Bob. A third party (Eve) is able
of eavesdropping on the transmissions. The received signals
at Bob and Eve are given by
y = hsdx+ nd (1a)
z = hsex+ ne (1b)
where hse and hsd are complex Gaussian random variables
(RV) with zero-mean. Nd and Ne denote zero-mean complex
Gaussian noise RVs with unit-variance. The instantaneous
SNRs α = |hsd|2 and β = |hse|2 are exponentially distributed.
The average value is λ1 and λ2, respectively.
Since α and β are correlated variables, the joint PDF is
expressed as [14][15]
f (α, β) =
I0
(
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where ρ is the correlation between hse and hsd. I0 (·) is the
zeroth-order modified Bessel function of the first kind. Using
the infinite-series representation of I0 (x) [16]
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x2k
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k
(k!)2(1−ρ)2k+1
.
In this study, we assume that Alice has access to CSI on
both the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel. For
instance, Eve may be not a covert eavesdropper, but simply
another user [6][7]. Alice wants to transmit some confidential
data to Bob which Alice does not wish Eve know. So, Alice
can estimate the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel [6][7].
III. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS OVER CORRELATED
RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNEL
Start with the technique detailed in [7], which introduces the
secrecy capacity over fading channel. A similar introduction
was presented in [8]. Recalling the results of [7] for the
Rayleigh fading wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity for one
realization can be written as
Cs (α, β) =
{
ln (1 + α)− ln (1 + β) , if α > β
0 , if α 6 β
(4)
where ln (1 + α) is the rate of the main channel, and
ln (1 + β) denotes the rate of the eavesdropper’s channel.
A. average secrecy capacity
The average secrecy capacity over correlated channels is
derived as follows.
Theorem 1: The average secrecy capacity is averaged over
all channel realizations
Cs =
∫
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where function F (λ, k, µ) can be recursively evaluated or
computed by using popular symbolic software like MATLAB.
After integration by parts, we get
F (λ, k, µ) =
∫
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0
ln (1 + λx) exp (−µx)xkdx
=
λ
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Fk +
k
µ
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where Fk is defined by [16, 3.353.5]
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Function F (λ, 0, µ) = 1µE1
(
µ
λ
)
exp
(
µ
λ
)
. E1 (x) =∫
∞
1
e−xt
t dt is the exponential-integral function [16]. Γ (·) is
the gamma function [16].
Proof: The integral in (5) is re-expressed as
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The integral R1k can be evaluated by[16, 3.381.1]
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where γ (·, ·) is the incomplete gamma function defined by
[16]
γ (n+ 1, x) = n!− n!e−x
n∑
m=0
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Further with some manipulations, R1k can be rewritten as
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Using (6), we can evaluate the integral
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Similarly, we evaluate R2k by using the complementary incom-
plete gamma function Γ (n+ 1, x) = n!e−x
n∑
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yields
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3B. outage probability of secrecy capacity
The secrecy capacity can also be characterized in terms of
the outage probability for a target secrecy rate. The outage
probability can be calculated according to
Pout (R) = 1− Pr (Cs (α, β) > R)
= 1− Pr
(
α > eR (1 + β)− 1
)
Theorem 2: Similarly invoking again the infinite-series rep-
resentation of I0 (x), the outage probability is equivalent to
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where y =
(
eR − 1
)
/λ1 and µ = eRλ2/λ1.
At this point in this study, the closed-form expressions of
secrecy capacity have been derived for a correlated Rayleigh
fading channel. In all cases of practical significance, the infi-
nite series representations can be truncated without sacrificing
numerical accuracy. We also note that the results in [7] are a
special case of our result by assuming independent channels.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In Fig. 2, we plot the secrecy capacity versus SNR over
correlated fading channels in the case of the scenario that the
SNR of main channel and eavesdropper’s channel are equal.
It is clearly shown that the correlation between the main
and the eavesdropper’s channel reduce the secrecy capacity.
For comparison, the limiting value given in [14] also is
depicted in Fig 2. The secrecy capacity converges into the
limit of the secrecy capacity [14] at high SNRs. However, the
limiting value is far away form the secrecy capacity at low
and moderate SNRs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the secure communication
over correlated Rayleigh fading Wyner’s wiretap channel. The
closed form expressions for average secrecy capacity and
outage probability are derived assuming the full channel state
information available.
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